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An influential view of the nature of the language system is that of an evolved 
biological system in which a set of rules is combined with a lexicon that contains the 
words of the language together with a representation of their context. Alternative 
views, usually based on connectionist modeling, attempt to explain the structure of 
language on the basis of complex associative processes. Here I put forward a third 
view that stresses experience-dependent structural development of the brain circuits 
supporting language as a core principle of the organization of the language system. 
On this view, embodied in a recent neuroconstructivist neural network of past tense 
development and processing, initial domain-general predispositions enable the 
development of functionally specialized brain structures through interactions between 
experience-dependent brain development and statistical learning in a structured 
environment. Together, these processes shape a biological adult language system that 
appears to separate into distinct mechanism for processing rules and exceptions, 
whereas in reality those subsystems co-develop and interact closely. This view puts 
experience-dependent brain development in response to a specific language 
environment at the heart of understanding not only language development but adult 
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One of the most fundamental questions in the organization of the cognitive system is 
whether it is made up of specialized modules that have evolved to take on a specific 
function, or whether its organization is plastic and functional specialization arises 
from dynamic interactions with the environment. This debate is closely linked to the 
question of the origin of cortical specialization in the brain.  
The modular view has seen a number of instantiations, notably Fodor’s (1981) 
‘Modularity of Mind’ hypothesis, and, more recently, ‘massive modularity’ (e.g., 
Carruthers, 2006). On this view, evolved specialized modules exist for specific 
cognitive functions such as theory of mind (Scholl & Leslie, 1999), number 
(Dehaene, 1997), face perception (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997), language 
(Pinker, 1994), and others. One argument put forward to support this view has been 
that from an evolutionary perspective, many highly functionally specialized modules 
are more efficient than fewer, more general processing systems so that the former 
organization would be favored in natural selection (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006). In turn, 
the discovery of such modules would imply that they evolved because no other 
process is known that can create complex functional designs in organisms.  
A second argument for massive modularity has been one of computational 
tractability (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Samuels, 2005). Learning in some domains, 
most notably language, would not be feasible in an unconstrained learner, but if 
knowledge of the target domain is integrated into the learner a priori then the learning 
task becomes tractable. Therefore, evolution would again select for learning systems 
that are constrained with respect to solutions to a learning problem and that would 
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therefore make learning possible in the first place.  
In contrast, the ‘developmental’ view maintains that cortical processing 
mechanisms are domain general (O’Leary, 1989) and acquire their functional 
specialization in a protracted developmental process that is affected by the learner’s 
experience (Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997; Johnson, 2011). According to this view 
functional modules do not exist but development can lead to specialized areas that, 
however, overlap and support more than one function. This view has drawn on 
evidence from neuroscience showing that under altered afferent input, cortical areas 
assume different roles (for example, in blind people visual cortex supports processing 
of auditory and tactile stimuli; Burton, 2003) but also on developmental research 
showing progressive functional specialization and reorganization in the neural 
structures supporting specific functions such as face processing (de Haan, 2001). 
Modular theories of cognition usually de-emphasize the role of development 
in favor of the evolutionary process of natural selection in shaping cognitive systems. 
The EvoDevo approach has aimed to redress this imbalance by drawing on recent 
evidence from evolutionary biology suggesting that evolution and development 
interact in shaping the organism through epigenetic processes (Gottlieb, 2007; 
Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003). A central aspect of this approach is that an evolved 
organism develops its phenotype, and that development is a powerful force in shaping 
the adult organism. Furthermore, given recent evidence in epigenetics, there are close 
bi-directional interactions between development and the functional expression of 
genes (Moore, 2015).   
 
Experience-dependent brain development 
In this paper I focus on the important role of development for the adult cognitive 
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system from a neuroconstructivist perspective. The recent theoretical framework of 
neuroconstructivism (Mareschal et al., 2007; Westermann et al., 2007; Westermann, 
Thomas, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2010) focuses on brain development as the basis for 
cognitive development and asks how different interacting constraints shape this 
developmental trajectory. These constraints act on different levels: experience-
dependent neural development sculpts small-scale neural networks through cell-cell 
interactions. Different brain regions take on functional specialization through 
interaction and competition. The physical development of the child affords 
progressively more complex means to explore and manipulate the physical 
environment, generating new experiences that lead to cognitive, and neural, change. 
The changing social environment likewise shapes the child’s experiences and 
therefore, the brain. Finally, there are epigenetic interactions between genes and 
experiences and these will shape brain structures either directly or through brain-
body-environment loops (Westermann et al., 2007). From a neuroconstructivist 
perspective, cognitive development shapes the brain and the brain shapes cognitive 
development in a closely coupled loop. An implication of this view is that an 
understanding of the developmental process is essential for an understanding of the 
adult cognitive system which is an emergent outcome of this highly interactive 
developmental process. 
In recent years it has become abundantly clear that neural structures can be 
shaped by experience, and that differences in structure have functional consequences 
(Casey, Giedd, & Thomas, 2000; Casey, Tottenham, Liston, & Durston, 2005; Goh & 
Park, 2009; Johnson, 2011; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997). In 
the domain of language, attention has turned to the effects of different linguistic 
environments on brain organization in first and second language learners (Chen et al., 
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2009; Kochunov et al., 2003). For example, in one study native Chinese speakers 
living in the United States showed increases in four small regions in frontal, temporal 
and parietal cortex compared with native English speakers (Kochunov et al., 2003). 
These differences in brain structure were interpreted as resulting from the different 
orthographic, phonetic and semantic characteristics of Chinese and English impacting 
on experience-dependent brain development. In another study, bilingual adults’ grey 
matter differences in left inferior parietal cortex were linked to different levels of 
proficiency in the second language (Mechelli et al., 2004). In a longitudinal study on 
the effects of language experience on brain structures, adult interpreters undergoing 
intense language training showed structural increase in the hippocampus and several 
cortical areas after only three months of training (Mårtensson et al., 2012). 
Given these and many other findings it is plausible to assume that brain 
regions arrive at functional specialization less through natural selection followed by 
largely pre-specified development than through interactive neuroconstructivist 
processes on the basis of domain general learning mechanisms. Under this view it is 
not necessary to assume pre-specified evolved specialization to end up with efficient 
and effective specialized processing systems as argued in the massive modularity 
view.  
 
Tractability in developing systems 
But what about the intractability argument for massive modularity? Here, it is worth 
going back to the origins of this argument. These origins lie in the classical view of 
learning as one of finding hypotheses as solution to a problem (such as learning the 
grammar of one’s language) and evaluating these hypotheses against encountered data 
(Gold, 1967). When data are encountered that are incompatible with the current 
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hypothesis the hypothesis is discarded and a new one is chosen.  The intractability 
problem says that the space of possible hypotheses is so large that it becomes unlikely 
that the learner will ever find the correct hypothesis to the problem at hand. One way 
to overcome intractability is to restrict the hypothesis space a priori so that it contains 
only a small subset of all possible hypotheses. In this smaller subset the learning 
problem then becomes much easier, even under restricted experience with the 
environment. The universal grammar in language acquisition instantiates such an a 
priori restricted hypothesis space: from all possible grammars the subset of all 
possible human language grammars is pre-selected and the learner only needs to 
choose between one of these grammars, making language learning tractable.  
One problem with restricting the set of examined hypotheses a priori is, of 
course, that the correct hypothesis might be excluded and so the solution will never be 
found. By invoking evolution this case can be avoided because obviously a learner 
who can learn the correct hypothesis will have a selective advantage over one who 
does not.  
Yet, restricting the hypothesis space a priori is not the only solution to the 
intractability problem. It has been shown that gradual structural development of a 
learner provides an alternative to the initial restriction of the hypothesis space 
(Quartz, 1993). This argument was made with reference to artificial neural networks. 
The main idea is that the architecture of a neural network – specifically, the number 
of the network’s hidden units – restricts the hypothesis space (Baum, 1989). It is well 
known, for example, that neural networks without any hidden units can only compute 
a simple class of problems that are linearly separable (Minsky & Papert, 1969). The 
more hidden units a network has the more complex are the problems it can learn. If a 
model starts with a simple architecture and progressively adds hidden units as data are 
	 8	
encountered the hypothesis space is gradually expanded in a way that avoids 
intractability (White, 1990). In fact, it has been shown that such (neuro-)constructivist 
networks learn in polynomial time whereas training a fixed architecture network with 
as little as three hidden units can take exponential time or not succeed at all (Baum & 
Haussler, 1989).  
Together, the empirical evidence for experience-dependent structural brain 
development and the learning theoretic arguments for constructivist learning provide 
a powerful argument for the importance of structural change as a core principle of 
psychological development (Quartz, 1999; Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997). Nevertheless, 
despite providing an alternative to the assumptions of pre-specification inherent in the 
massively modular approach, structural change has so far found only little reflection 
in models of psychological development (Shultz, 2003; Westermann, Ruh, & 
Plunkett, 2009; Westermann, Sirois, Shultz, & Mareschal, 2006).  
 
Neuroconstructivist development in the English past tense 
We have recently presented a neuroconstructivist connectionist model of learning the 
English past tense that takes these considerations on board (Westermann & Ruh, 
2012). The English past tense has long been considered a model phenomenon for the 
language system in general (McClelland & Patterson, 2002; Pinker & Ullman, 2002, 
Seidenberg & Plaut, 2014). This is because, like language as a whole, the past tense 
includes rule-like processes as well as exceptions. Regular verbs are inflected by 
adding –ed to the verb stem (e.g., look-looked), whereas irregulars come in different 
varieties and need to be learned and memorized (e.g., sing-sang but bring-brought). 
This separation between regular and irregular verbs is one aspect of language where 
grammatical rules and lexical entries co-exist. The past tense has therefore been 
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termed the ‘drosophila of psycholinguistics’ because a very detailed examination of 
this small part of language allows us to develop a better understanding of how 
language is organized in general (Pinker, 1994).  
 Due to its importance for understanding the architecture of the language 
system, the mechanisms underlying past tense inflection have been hotly debated. 
According to the dual-mechanism or Words-and-Rules (WR) theory (Clahsen, 1999; 
Pinker, 1991, 1997; Pinker & Ullman, 2002; Ullman, 2004; Ullman et al., 1997) the 
distinction between regular and irregular forms directly maps onto separate 
mechanisms in the underlying processing structure, with regular forms produced by a 
mental rule and irregular forms retrieved from the mental lexicon. This approach is 
situated within the tradition of massive modularity with the assumption of evolved, 
specialized qualitatively distinct modules responsible for different aspects of 
processing. Evidence for WR is usually derived from identifying dissociations 
between regular and irregular verbs that occur in many aspects of processing. For 
example, when learning language children often make overregularization errors with 
irregular forms such as comed and eated but errors for regular verbs are less frequent 
(Marcus et al., 1992). In adults (and children) the regular form is generalized freely to 
novel verbs such as googled. In adult aphasic patients cases have been reported with 
selective sparing of regular forms in some and sparing of irregular forms in others 
(Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1997; Tyler et al., 2002; Ullman et al., 1997; Ullman et al., 
2005). And some imaging studies have identified brain areas that are more active for 
regular inflections than for irregulars and others that show the opposite activation 
pattern (Dhond, Marinkovic, Dale, Witzel, & Halgren, 2003; Jaeger et al., 1996).  
 Although WR is intuitively elegant in that it maps a grammatical property 
(regularity) onto the underlying processing structure, this account nevertheless has 
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been undermined by empirical data showing that dissociations between regulars and 
irregulars are much less clear cut than predicted by this theory. For example, it has 
been shown that errors in acquisition are predicted by statistical factors such as 
frequency, the phonological complexity of the verb stem, and the number of 
phonological friends (verbs with a similar stem and similar past tense form such as 
sing and ring) and enemies (verbs with a similar stem and different past tense forms 
such as sing and bring) (Marchman, 1997). Most imaging studies have not found clear 
regular/irregular dissociations, but some found enhanced activity in some areas for 
irregulars but no specific areas for regulars (Joanisse & Seidenberg, 2005), and others 
have argued that observed differences are best explained by phonological, not 
grammatical, differences between verbs (Desai, Conant, Waldron, & Binder, 2006; 
Joanisse & Seidenberg, 2005). Likewise, dissociation profiles in aphasic patients are 
affected by phonological factors (Bird, Lambon-Ralph, Seidenberg, McClelland, & 
Patterson, 2003), and there are virtually no reported cases of fully preserved irregular 
inflection with impaired regular inflection (Faroqi-Shah, 2007), a pattern that would 
be expected if the rule-system were selectively damaged. While proponents of WR 
have tried to integrate some of this empirical evidence into a modified theory in 
which regular forms can also be stored in the lexicon and therefore show aspects of 
associative memory such as frequency effects (Pinker & Ullman, 2002), this 
modification has made the theory overly descriptive and hard to falsify since it is not 
clear exactly which regulars should be stored and which should not. As WR has never 
been implemented in a working model it remains difficult to evaluate its assumptions 
and predictions in detail.   
 The empirical evidence showing graded dissociations and effects of statistical 
factors is more in line with an alternative theory to WR, the single mechanism or 
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connectionist view (Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1999; McClelland & Patterson, 2002; 
Plunkett & Juola, 1999). On this view, all forms, regulars and irregulars alike, are 
produced by the same associative mechanism, and processing differences between 
verbs arise from statistical factors such as frequency, phonological complexity, and 
similarities between different verbs. Some instantiations of this view claim that 
whereas regular inflection relies on phonological representations of the verb, irregular 
forms are produced on the basis of semantic information (Joanisse & Seidenberg, 
1999). The single mechanism view is closely associated with connectionist models 
and there have been several neural network implementations of past tense models 
(e.g., Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1999; Plunkett & Juola, 1999; Rumelhart & 
McClelland, 1986).   
 While the empirical evidence appears to be incompatible with a modular, dual 
mechanism system of verb inflection, single mechanism approaches as well have 
come under criticism. Single mechanism arguments are generally put forward in the 
form of implemented computational models, and by necessity they can be analyzed in 
more detail than the verbal WR theory and therefore offer intrinsically more scope for 
criticism. Nevertheless, two valid points can be raised: first, different models have 
each focused on a small subset of phenomena (Pinker & Ullman, 2003). There are 
models for acquisition, others for adult generalization, and yet others for breakdown 
after brain damage. However, given that it is the same mind/brain that passes through 
acquisition, adult processing and breakdown in principle a single model should be 
able to account for this range of behaviors. Second, most of the single mechanism 
models have accounted for data more in a proof-of-concept manner rather than in 
ways that stand up to close comparison with empirical data. For example, models of 
children’s errors in learning the past tense have mostly not closely compared error 
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patterns with reported children’s errors (a task that admittedly is not facilitated by the 
relative scarcity of such empirical data). Similarly, the best-known model of 
breakdown after brain damage (Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1999) was unable to produce 
cases in which irregular performance is higher than that for regulars, although this 
pattern is frequently found in aphasic patients (Faroqi-Shah, 2007).  
Recently Westermann and Ruh (2012) put forward an alternative theory to the 
established positions. This neuroconstructivist view of past tense processing argued 
that the core to understanding the inflection system is to appreciate that it emerges 
from experience-dependent brain development in a structured environment. Like in 
other connectionist approaches there is a single domain general learning mechanism, 
but experience-dependent structural change leads to a differentiated architecture in the 
adult system. Specifically, because new structure is added when the existing structure 
is insufficient to learn new forms, the system develops areas of functional 
specialization for forms that are easy to process and those that are hard to process. 
Westermann and Ruh (2012) presented a neural network model that implemented 
these principles by starting out with a minimal architecture and gradually adding (and 
deleting) hidden units as learning progressed.  
This neuroconstructivist model accounted for a broad range of empirical data 
in past tense processing. First, while learning past tense forms the model made 
characteristic overregularization errors (such as comed and eated). In accordance with 
empirical work, error rates were lower for high-frequency verbs and for verbs that 
were classified as ‘vulnerable’ on the basis of statistical properties such as few 
phonological friends and more phonological enemies (Marchman, 1997).  
A second set of results concerned modeling adults’ generalization to non-
words. After the model had acquired the past tense forms of all verbs, it generalized to 
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new forms in ways that closely matched data from experiments with adults (Prasada 
& Pinker, 1993). Specifically, the model produced regular inflections for highly 
unusual novel verbs such as ploamph. Previous static connectionist models did not 
show such default generalization behavior that has been seen as strong evidence for 
dual mechanism accounts with default application of the rule (Prasada & Pinker, 
1993). Importantly, the neuroconstructivist model even displayed default 
generalization when it was trained with an artificially low proportion of regular verbs 
so that the regular case became a minority default. Again, the productive application 
of a minority regular form had been taken as strong evidence for dual mechanism 
accounts (Marcus, Brinkmann, Clahsen, Wiese, & Pinker, 1995).    
 Third, when the fully trained model was then damaged by removing units and 
connections, it accounted for breakdown profiles after brain damage in aphasic 
patients. Specifically, when some or all of the inserted hidden units were removed the 
model’s performance reflected data from agrammatic aphasic patients with a 
breakdown in irregular performance with preservation of regular inflections. 
Conversely, when the initial pathway was lesioned and only the inserted structure was 
preserved, the model showed a decline for both regular and irregular forms that was 
more marked for regulars. This impairment profile matched in its range the profiles of 
aphasic patients with more preserved irregular performance (Faroqi-Shah, 2007). 
Fourth, Westermann and Ruh (under revision) showed that the model 
successfully simulated activation patterns from brain imaging studies of past tense 
inflection. Using synthetic MRI—the analysis of activation patterns in the model 
when processing different verbs—the model showed dissociations between regular 
and irregular forms, but deeper analysis revealed that these dissociations were graded 
and were based on the distributional statistical properties of verbs.  
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The neuroconstructivist theory instantiated in this model therefore suggests 
that the structure of the past tense task, expressed in the relationship of verbs to all 
other verbs in the language (e.g., phonological overlap with other forms) together 
with the statistical properties of the verbs themselves (e.g., frequency), manifests 
itself in the brain’s processing structures through development. This process leads to 
the emergence of areas of functional specialization that superficially appear like 
modules but that, on closer inspection, reveal graded differences between verbs. A 
prediction of this view is that processing differences between verbs in the intact brain, 
and patterns of breakdown in the lesioned brain, are an outcome of the statistical 
properties of verbs in the language that have become internalized into the brain’s 
neural circuits.  
In sum, by integrating experience-dependent structural development into a 
model of past tense learning and processing, the model was able to provide an 
integrated account of development, adult generalization, brain activation patterns, and 
breakdown profiles after brain damage. Much of the empirical data accounted for by 
the model had previously been taken as evidence of a modular dual mechanisms 
account of inflection processing, but the model employed only a single associative 
mechanism. In its comprehensive and detailed accounting for empirical data the 
neuroconstructivist model went beyond other existing neurocomputational models 
that relied on static prespecified architectures and that usually only simulated one 
aspect of past tense processing.  
Although the experience-dependent overproduction and deletion of structure 
in the model agree with proposals about the mechanisms of gradual elaboration of 
neural circuits in the brain (Greenough, Black & Wallace, 1987), the specific 
mechanisms employed in the model are unlikely to find direct correspondence at the 
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neural level.  In this sense the model is an abstraction from the low-level neural 
development in the cortex investigating the impact of experience-dependent structural 




The EvoDevo approach to language evolution and development has argued against 
the notion of evolved and functionally pre-specified modules as an outcome of 
evolutionary pressures and has shifted the focus on interactions between epigenetic 
processes and phenotypic development. I have here discussed the importance of 
experience-dependent structural brain changes as a central aspect of phenotypic 
cognitive development and I have argued that functional specialization can emerge as 
the outcome of experience-dependent neural change in a structured environment. I 
then described a recent neuroconstructivist model of the acquisition and adult 
processing of the English past tense that implemented these considerations 
(Westermann & Ruh, 2012; Westermann & Ruh, under revision). The English past 
tense is particularly well suited for evaluating EvoDevo approaches to language 
because first, the past tense stands as a model system for language as a whole with a 
combination of regular (rule-like) and irregular cases, second, it has been studied 
empirically in great detail and so it is clear what data a successful theory has to 
account for, and third, one of the main theories explaining past tense processing is 
based on those massive modularity views arising from evolutionary psychology that 
have been criticized in EvoDevo approaches.     
In the neurocontructivist model, experience-dependent learning mechanisms 
extract statistical regularities from the language environment and internalize these 
regularities as regions of functional specialization in the model structure. This process 
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enabled the model to account for a broad range of empirical data from acquisition, 
adult generalization, brain activation patterns obtained in imaging studies, and 
patterns of breakdown after brain damage. Much of these data have previously been 
taken as evidence for a modular account of past tense processing. The model further 
suggested that explaining dissociations in past tense processing as between regular 
and irregular verbs is a post-hoc abstraction of in reality graded dissociations that are 
based on the distributional statistical properties of verbs. At least in this case, 
therefore, the assumption of modularity arises out of an abstracted view of the data 
that exaggerates dissociations and then attributes separate mechanisms to the 
dissociated processes. 
The neuroconstructivist view presented here is radically different from the 
claim that functionally specialized modules are selected for through evolutionary 
pressures while de-emphasizing phenotypic development. It is more in line with 
empirical evidence for initially uncommitted cortical structures and experience-
dependent structural changes in the brain. In line with the EvoDevo approach it 
suggests that selection pressures operate less on specialized brain structures than on 
development mechanisms that enable the effective learning from the statistics of the 
environment and the construction of brain structures that can process this information 
efficiently. While the neuroconstructivist model described here focuses on the ‘devo’ 
aspect of EvoDevo, it is worth considering at what level evolutionary selection might 
take place. One possibility is that evolution favors systems with ‘modularized’ areas 
of functional specialization for specific tasks because they facilitate processing of 
separate tasks by reducing interference (Bullinaria, 2007). From this perspective a 
genotype could be selected for that favors a developmental outcome of modularized 
structures. On another perspective one could assume that the modularized structure of 
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the developed past tense system is an emergent outcome of very general learning 
mechanisms enabling experience-dependent structural development. Under this view 
the human brain could have evolved to develop in a protracted way in order to 
maximize the contribution of experience to its structural elaboration (Johnson, 2009) 
but without a bias to favor certain developmental outcomes. This latter view might be 
more plausible, given that in such a scenario modularized structures can still develop 
when they are beneficial for processing, but non-modular systems would develop for 
cases when they confer a processing advantage (see Bullinaria, 2007). 
While the pathways by which genes affect developmental and thus adult 
cognitive processing structures are currently unknown, at least in developmental 
disorders a valid initial assumption is that some genetic abnormalities manifest 
themselves in some alterations of a typical developmental process with a phenotypic 
outcome of atypical processing structures. Initial work has been done to explore 
variations on the parameters in neural networks (e.g., numbers of units, connection 
patterns, activation functions) (Thomas, Ronald, & Forrester, 2009) with promising 
results, but this work has focused on static networks with a pre-determined 
architecture. It will be beneficial to extend such work to models that show experience-
dependent structural development as a core aspect of their learning. In these types of 
models additional variations that can be assumed to be an outcome of genetic 
variation are possible, such as in the rate of structural growth (e.g., overproliferation 
of new structure, excessive neural pruning) and it is reasonable to expect that changes 
in these parameters will interact with changes in other aspects of the models’ 
functioning, leading to a richer picture of how genes and cognitive development 
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